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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
wondered whether such a result would comply with the decisions
of the Supreme Court relative to justiciability under the "case or
controversy" concept. Were adjudication held to be appropri-
ate under the circumstances of the instant case, there can be no
doubt that the requirement of true adversity in proceedings be-
fore the Court would be greatly diminished. When the petitioner
in the instant case satisfied the sentence imposed upon him by
the State of Texas, the respondent, General Manager of the
Texas Prison System, ceased to have any interest in his further
detention. Thus, it appears that should the decision which
the dissenters urged have obtained, it would not only have been
an unwarranted expansion of the traditional limitations of the
writ of habeas corpus, but also it would accord with neither the
spirit nor the letter of the constitutional demand for adversity.
The instant case poses yet another problem, viz., its possible
impact on the rule derived from the Fiswick and Morgan cases.
It is suggested that, considering the fact that the petitioner in
the instant case did apprise the Court of the conviction's poten-
tially adverse effects on his civil rights,27 if his case had come
before the Court on direct review, rather than as a collateral
attack under the habeas corpus statute, the case would have re-
ceived attention on its merits in spite of the petitioner's release.
The fact that four Justices would have heard the case despite the
limited scope of the writ of habeas corpus strengthens this con-
clusion. It is felt the allowance of such reviews would not do
violence to the adversity requirement, because the state would be
the adverse party and its interest in maintaining proper convic-
tions would be opposed to that asserted by ex-convicts in seek-
ing to have their convictions overturned.
George M. Snellings III
CRIMINAL LAW - SUFFICIENCY OF STATUTORY DEFINITION UNDER
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS
Defendant, a nightclub dancer, was charged with a violation
of the Louisiana obscenity statute,' in having allegedly commit-
27. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 29-30, Parker v. Ellis, 80 Sup. Ct. 909 (U.S.
1960).
1. LA. R.S. 14:106(3) (1950).
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ted "an act of lewd and indecent dancing."' 2 She filed a motion to
quash the indictment on the ground that the statute was uncon-
stitutional in that the terms "Performance by any person... P
in any public place or in any public manner, of any act of lewd-
ness or indecency, grossly scandalous, and tending to debauch the
morals and manners of the people"3 were so vague and indefinite
that defendant was not informed of the criminal charge against
her.4 The trial court sustained the motion. On appeal and re-
hearing, the Supreme Court held, affirmed. Statutory definition
of a criminal offense must be sufficiently specific and accurate
so any reader having ordinary intelligence will be clearly ap-
prised as to whether or not his conduct will be denounced as an
offense. The statute did not set forth the particular lewd or in-
decent conduct the legislature sought to punish as a crime. State
v. Christine, 239 La. 259, 118 So.2d 403 (1960).
A general statement of the requirement of sufficiency of defi-
nition is declared in Article I, Section 10, of the Louisiana Con-
stitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."
This requirement has proved difficult to meet in the area of
obscenity. The word "obscenity," like "morality" or "decency,"
is difficult to define because such definition requires the applica-
tion of individual moral standards. As Mr. Justice Cardozo has
stated, "Morality is not merely different in different commu-
nities. Its level is not the same for all the component groups
within the same community." This difficulty manifests itself in
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. . . ." Defendant
also claimed that the statute was unconstitutional under Article I, § 2 ("No per-
son shall be deprived of . . . liberty or property, except by due process of law")
and Article I, § 9 (the accused "shall have the right to defend himself") of the
Louisiana Constitution, and that the statute was also violative of the Sixth Amend-
ment (the accused must be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation")
and the Fourteenth Amendment (in that the action of the state would deprive
the accused of liberty and property without due process of law, and the accused
would be denied the equal protection of the laws) of the United States Constitu-
tion.
5. LA. CO NST. art. I, § 10.
6. CARDozo, THE PARADOXES Op LEGAL SCIENCE 37 (1928). Substantiating this
idea is the fact that, in several instances, materials which have been found obscene
in one jurisdiction have been held to be unobjectionable under the comparable
laws of neighboring states. This is illustrated by the fact that while the novel
God's Little Acre was declared obscene in Massachusetts (Attorney General v.
Book named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 92 N.E.2d 819 (1950)), and
Memoirs of Recate County was found to be obscene in New York (Doubleday &
Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1949)), there was no finding that either of these
books had been held to be obscene in any other state. See Note, 5 N.Y.L.F. 93,
96, n. 20 (1959).
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two distinct areas: that of the proper jurisprudential test by
which to determine the constitutionality of an obscenity statute
as applied, and the determination of the constitutional limitations
of the statute on its face.
The first major jurisprudential definition of a standard to
apply to obscenity legislation came in 1868 in the English case of
Regina v. Hicklin,7 in which the defendant was convicted of dis-
tributing literature which levelled grave charges of moral de-
pravity at members of the Jesuit priesthood. The court stated
that the test of obscenity was: "Whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall."8 This rule was gen-
erally followed by American courts, 9 although its operation was
vigorously criticized by Judge Learned Hand in United States V.
Kennerley.10 Although applying the rule because he felt bound
by precedent, he reasoned that the test was faulty in that it re-
quired the isolation of passages which might otherwise be termed
"honestly relevant to the adequate expression of innocent
ideas,"" and judged the material by its effect on the weakest
members of society. Judge Hand's admonition was recognized in
United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses,12 in which the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit espoused the "dominant effect"
theory, which takes into consideration the relevancy of allegedly
obscene passages to the central theme of the work and its estab-
lished reputation in the estimation of approved critics. This test,
therefore, requires the entire work to be examined instead of
selected passages taken out of context. In Roth v. United States1'
the United States Supreme Court approved charges of the lower
court which defined material as obscene if it tended to arouse
"lustful thoughts" as judged by "contemporary community
standards.' 4 However, while approving these instructions, the
court accepted the new rule as promulgated in the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, which states that, "a thing is ob-
7. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
8. Id. at 371.
9. United States v. Smith, 45 Fed. 476 (E.D. Wis. 1891) ; United States v.
Harmon, 45 Fed. 414 (D. Kan. 1891) ; United States v. Clarke, 38 Fed. 500 (E.D.
Mo. 1889) ; United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1879).
10. 209 Fed. 119 (S.D. N.Y. 1913).
11. Id. at 120-21.
12. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), affirming 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
13. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14. Id. at 489.
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scene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to pru-
rient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or
excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters . . . Ob-
scenity shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults."'15 Con-
fusion is engendered by the fact that the Model Code expressly
rejects the "lustful thoughts" theory on the grounds that it is
unrealistically broad and that governmental regulation of
thoughts and desires as opposed to overt commissions raises both
serious constitutional and practical difficulties."' The definition
of obscenity in terms of a tendency to arouse lustful thoughts, ac-
cording to the Institute, "makes the criminal law a battleground
for conflicting moralities, ethics and aesthetics, contrary to the
principle that criminal law must be reserved for that which the
whole community condemns."'1 7 Despite this apparent conflict
inherent in the Roth opinion, it may be concluded that the United
States Supreme Court has fully adopted the "dominant appeal to
prurient interest" standard of obscenity, and that it stands as
the current federal test.'
In addition the Court in Roth made the following statement
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957). The omitted
portion is as follows: "A thing is obscene even if the obscenity is latent, as in the
case of. undeveloped photographs. Obscenity shall be judged with reference to
ordinary adults, except that it shall be judged with reference to children or other
specially susceptible audience if it appears from the character of the material or
the circumstances of its dissemination to be specially designed for or directed to
such an audience. In any prosecution for an offense under this section evidence
shall be admissible to show:
"(a) the character of the audience for which the material was designed or to
which it was directed;
"(b) what the predominant appeal of the material would be for ordinary
adults or a special audience, and what effect, if any, it would probably have on
behavior of such people;
"(c) artistic, literary, scientific, educational or other merits of the material;
"(d) the degree of public acceptance of the material in this country;
"(e) appeal to prurient interest, or absence thereof, in advertising or other
promotion of the material;
"(f) [purpose and reputation of the author, publisher, or disseminator.]"
Expert testimony and testimony of the author, creator or publisher relating to
factors entering into the determination of the issue of obscenity shall be admis-
sible.
16. Id. Comments at 10. See also Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the
Courts, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 587, 593 (1955).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2), at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
18. Smith v. People, 80 Sup. Ct. 215 (1959) ; Grove Press, Inc. v. Christen-
berry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960); Flying Eagle Productions, Inc. v. United
States, 273 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1960) ; Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d 140
(8th Cir. 1959) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Hendricks, 262 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1.958) ;
United States v. Keller, 259 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Sunshine Book Co. v. Sum-
merfield, 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 182 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1960) ; Poss v. Christenberry, 179 F. Supp.
411 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Werner v. City of Knoxville, 161 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Tenn.
1958) ; United States v. 31 Photographs, Etc., 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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in reference to the other major problem encountered in this
area, the interpretation of the terms of obscenity laws with a
view toward determining whether or not the statute fulfills the
constitutional requirements of statutory definition:
"Many decisions have recognized that the terms of obscenity
statutes are not precise. This Court, however, has consist-
ently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the
requirements of due process. ... '[T]he Constitution does
not require impossible standards; all that is required is that
the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practices.' -19
The problem of statutory definition is heightened by the fact
that most obscenity statutes utilize many adjectives such as
"lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent ... or disgusting," 20 which
are equally imprecise, and which depend on each other for defi-
nition. Louisiana jurisprudence has experienced much the same
difficulty with such words as lewd, immoral, indecent, and
obscene as has been experienced in other jurisdictions. In 1883,
the Louisiana Supreme Court sustained the use of the words
"disorderly and indecent manner" in a bawdy-house ordinance.21
In 1919, the court in City of Shreveport v. Wilson,22 stated that
the term "or other lewd or indecent act" was too vague and
indefinite to meet the test of constitutionality when used in an
anti-prostitution ordinance, although the court did not determine
the question of constitutionality in disposing of the case. One
year later the court held that the term "lewd dancing" was
not too vague to inform the defendant of the charge against
him.2  Conceding that the term "lewd" had no statutory or tech-
nical definition, the court said that "it has, particularly when
applied to dancing, the very well and generally understood and
unmistakable meaning, indecent, lascivious, lecherous, tending
to excite lustful thoughts. If all of these qualifying terms were
contained in the statute, they would amount to nothing but
tautology. '24 In State v. Truby,25 the court declared that the
word "immoral" as used in the disorderly houses statute26 had
19. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
20. N.Y. Penal Law § 1141.
21. City of Shreveport v. Fanny Roos, 35 La. Ann. 1011 (1883).
22. 145 La. 906, 83 So. 186 (1919) (dictum).
23. State v. Rose, 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643 (1920).
24. Id. at 251, 84 So. at 646.
25. 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758 (1947).
26. LA. R.S. 14:104 (1950).
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no definite meaning and was unconstitutionally vague. The ob-
scenity statute met its first test of validity in State v. Kraft.2 7
The court held that the use of the word indecent in the phrase
"indecent print, picture" rendered the statute unconstitutionally
vague. The 1950 legislature revised the statute to read "sexually
indecent print"2 (emphasis added), which wording the court
upheld in 1954 in State v. Roth.
29
Concomitant with the requisite that criminal statutes are
stricti juris and must be strictly construed in favor of the de-
fendant 30 is the generally accepted canon of construction that
penal statutes are not to be given the narrowest possible mean-
ing but that the "language of the statute should be given a rea-
sonable or common sense construction, consonant with the ob-
jects of the legislation." 31 This canon is expressed in Article 3
of the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942 which requires that all
criminal provisions "shall be given a genuine construction, ac-
cording to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual
sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the
purpose of the provision. '32 This rule of construction reflects
the technique used in the Criminal Code of 1942, i.e., generali-
zation of terms as opposed to the technique of minutely detailed
specification. Such a drafting style makes possible a greater
coverage of prohibited conduct and eliminates the defense that
the conduct involved is not included in the specific enumera-
tion.3 3 The technique of generalization was approved in such
cases in State v. Pete,3 4 which upheld the theft article3 5 of the
Criminal Code against an attack of unconstitutional vagueness
This article, which consolidated the many early common law
stealing crimes into one clear provision, is probably the most
general statement in the Criminal Code. This method has also
been accepted, without any serious challenge, in the definition
of such basic crimes as burglary8 and gambling.3 In several
27. 214 La. 351, 37 So.2d 815 (1948).
28. La. Acts 1950, No. 314, § 1.
29. 226 La. 1, 74 So.2d 392 (1954).
30. State v. Vanicor, 239 La. 357. 118 So.2d 438" (1960); State v. Penniman,
224 La. 95, 68 So.2d 770 (1953) ; State v. Truby, 211 La. 178. 29 So.2d 758
(1947) ; State v. Gelbach, 205 La. 340, 17 So.2d 349 (1944) ; State v. Laborde,
202 La. 59, 11 So.2d 404, 144 A.L.R. 1376 (1943).
31. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5606 (3d ed. 1943).
32. LA. R.S. 14:3 (1950).
33. See Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, A Comparison with Prior Lou-
isiana Criminal Law, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 6, 7, n. 2 (1942). See also"3
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5607 (3d ed. 1943).
34. 206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944).
35. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
36. State v. Route, 221 La. 50, 58 So.2d 556 (1952).
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cases in which the Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld these
general. provisions, it has -been clearly expressed that the rule
of.,stricti juris would not be applied with such "unreasonable
technicality" as to defeat the very meaning and intent of the
statutes.38
It is submitted that the majority opinion in the instant case,
while giving full effect to the rule of stricti juris, failed to
utilize the rules of genuine construction which have been em-
bodied in both the Criminal Code and jurisprudence. As the
United States Supreme Court said in Roth, the requirement of
statutory definition is only that the "language conveys suf-
ficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices." (Emphasis
added.) 9 It would appear that an application of this rule in
conjunction with a more genuine construction of the Louisiana
obscenity statute would have led the court to a different result
in the instant case. Furthermore, as Mr. Justice Hamiter points
out in his dissenting opinion, 40 the only case of those cited by the
majority that dealt squarely with lewd and indecent acts was
that of City of Shreveport v. Wilson,4' in which the question of
constitutionality was not reached by the court.4 2
A sequel to the Christine case is the 1960 amendment of Lou-
isiana Revised Statutes 14:106, 4 which utilizes the very specifi-
cation technique that the draftsmen of the Criminal Code sought
to avoid. In an effort to comply with the Christine ruling, the
legislature was forced to define an obscene performance in these
tautologous terms:
"Performance by any person or persons in the presence of
another person or persons with the intent of arousing Sexual
desire, of any lewd, lascivious, sexually indecent dancing,
lewd, lascivious or sexually indecent posing, lewd, lascivious
or sexually indecent body movement. '44
37. State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So.2d 106 (1945) ; State v. Davis, 208
La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945).
38. State v. Broussard, 213 La. 338, 34 So.2d 883 (1948) ; State v. Davis, 208
La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1946) ; State v. Bonner, 193 La. 402, 190 So. 626 (1939).
39. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
40. 239 La. 259, 298, 118 So.2d 403, 417 (1960).
41, 145 La. 906, 83 So. 186 (1919).
42. In reversing the convictions, the court there stated: "The only question
thus presented is whether the municipal ordinance has application to the facts
stated." 145 La. 906, 908, 83 So. 186, 187 (1919).
43. La. Acts 1960, No. 199, § 1.
44. LA. R.S. 14:106(4) (1950), as amended.
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The instant case seems to impose "impossible standards" 45 on the
drafting of valid obscenity legislation, and denies the operation
of the "genuine construction" rule of the Criminal Code. Such a
construction seemingly runs contrary to the obvious intent and
purpose of the legislation, and it is submitted that a more reason-
able construction of such statutes will better serve to accord
them their appropriate scope, and to fulfill the objectives of legis-
lative design.
James A. George
MINERAL RIGHTS- ALIENATION OF MINERALS BY STATE
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS AND AGENCIES
Plaintiff instituted a concursus proceeding to determine the
ownership of proceeds from the production of oil and gas on
the land in question. A dispute over the ownership of the min-
erals existed between the claimant school board and the claimant
Harrison. The school board acquired the property by purchase,
and by mesne conveyances the title ultimately descended to
Harrison. In the deeds the minerals were neither excepted nor
mentioned. Harrison executed an oil, gas, and mineral lease to
plaintiff, and about one year later, claimant school board exe-
cuted a similar lease to plaintiff. The trial court determined
that the school board was included within the ambit of Article
IV, Section 2, of the State Constitution of 1921, which provides
that mineral rights sold by the state shall be reserved and thus
by virtue of the constitutional provision could not alienate the
minerals on any land it sold. Therefore, the State of Louisiana,
through its agent the school board, was found to be the owner
of the minerals. The court of appeal reversed and on review by
the Louisiana Supreme Court, held, judgment of the court of
appeal affirmed. The constitutional. provision of Article IV, Sec-
tion 2, applies to the "state" only and not to a political subdivi-
sion or state agency. Thus the sale of the land included the
mineral rights since the latter were not expressly reserved by
the school board. Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115 So.2d
373 (1959).
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 in Article IV, Section 2,
provides: "In all cases the mineral rights on any and all property
45. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
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